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NECESSITOUS INTERVENTION WITH 
SPECIAL REFERENCE TO PRESERVATION 
OF PROPERTY
By Lawson A.W. H unterf 
INTRODUCTION
Circumstances arise from time to time when human beings 
feel compelled, for moral, humanitarian or other reasons, to in­
tervene in another’s affairs without request to protect the other 
person’s health, property or interests. The question to be discussed 
in this essay is whether such an intermeddler can claim recom­
pense from the benefactor of his actions or does the law deny 
him recovery.
The Roman law of negotiorum gestio holds that “a volunteer, 
who believed in good faith that the interests of an absent friend 
were in danger of suffering by neglect, might act for him”1 and 
recover his reasonable expenses. The English common law, how­
ever, is said to hold no such principle.2 “Liabilities are not to be 
forced on people behind their backs . . . .”3
Are there any circumstances where the common law courts 
have recognized the principle of necessitous intervention; and, if 
so, what are they? Would the recognition of such a principle be a 
worthwhile addition to the law from a policy point of view? Are 
there any common law doctrines which could adapt the principle? 
These are some of the questions to be considered. In considering 
these questions special emphasis will be given to the cases where 
a benefit is conferred by the preservation of property.
t  Lawson A.W . Hunter: LL.B., University of New Brunswick, LL.M., Harvard 
University, Executive Assistant to the Deputy Minister o f Consumer and Cor­
porate Affairs, Ottawa. This article was originally prepared for a seminar in 
Restitution given at the U.N.B. Law School, 1968-69. It has been updated and 
revised slightly.
1 M. Radin, H andbook o f  Rom an Law  (1927), at pp. 301-302.
2 G.H.L. Fridman, The Quasi-Contractual A sp ec ts  o f  Unjust Enrichm ent (1956), 
34 Can. Bar Rev. 393. at p. 413.
3 Falcke  v. Scottish Im perial Insurance Co. (1887), 34 Ch.D. 234, at p. 249.
(C.A.).
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THE PRESENT STATE OF THE LAW OF VOLUNTEERS
(1) CONTRA CTUA L SITU  A TIONS
In Anglo-Canadian law a person intervening in the affairs of 
another will be responsible to the other party for any damage 
done as a consequence of such intermeddling but will derive no 
rights as a result thereof.4
This rather harsh doctrine was specifically laid down in 
Falcke v. Scottish Imperial Insurance Co. s where Bowen L.J. said:
The general principle is. beyond all question, that work or labour done 
or money expended by one man to preserve or benefit the property of 
another do not according to English law create any lien upon the prop­
erty saved or benefited, nor even, if standing alone, create any obli­
gation to repay the expenditure.6
Let us look at the facts of this case.
Falcke held a mortgage on a life insurance policy owned by 
E. D., purporting to act for Falcke, agreed to sell Falcke’s interest 
in the policy back to E. On this understanding E paid a year’s 
premium on the policy to keep it alive. The policy was later sold 
by Falcke’s representative to enforce the security. The court held 
that no contract existed between E and Falcke. Consequently, 
E’s claim that he held a lien on the mortgage was rejected. Neither 
was he entitled to recover the premium he had paid from the 
proceeds of the sale.
Based on the facts and the method the Court used in dis­
posing of the claim, the case is not clearly an example of necessi­
tous intervention. E’s claim to a lien on the mortgage was an effort 
to protect what he thought was his own property interest. He 
was not making the claim as a stranger or volunteer in a true sense. 
Thus, it may be argued that Bowen L.J.’s comments are mer«. 
obiter.1 Another submission is that Bowen L.J.’s language in the 
Falcke case indicates that he was not talking in terms of quasi­
contract but on the “straightforward principles of contract.”8 
Therefore, the judgment should have limited application to the 
law of quasi-contract. Regardless of these arguments, the case has 
been followed in so many instances, both English and Canadian,
4 Ernest G. Lorenzen, The Negotiorum  G estio  in Rom an and M odern C ivil Law  
(1928). 13 C om . L.Q. 190.
5 Falcke  v. Scottish  Im perial Insurance Co. (1887), 34 Ch.D. 234 (C.A.).
6 Ibid.. at pp. 248-249.
7 R. G off and G. Jones, The Law o f  R estitu tion  (1966), at p. 239.
8 G.H.L. Fridman, The Quasi-Contractual A sp ec ts  o f  Unjust E nrichm ent (1956),
34 Can. Bar Rev. 393, at p. 419.
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that it must be taken as the present statement of the law.9
The courts have allowed certain exceptions to the doctrine 
as stated in the Falcke case. The most obvious exception is the 
case of salvage at sea. Bowen L.J.’s explanation of this exception 
was:
The Maritime law for the purpose o f public policy, and for advantage 
of trade, imposed in these cases a liability upon the thing saved, a li­
ability which is a special consequence arising out of the character of 
m erchantile enterprises, the nature o f sea perils, and the fact that the 
thing saved  w as saved  under great stress and e x c e p tio n a l c ir ­
cum stances.10
With the development of alternate modes of transportation 
perhaps the economic arguments underlying the exception in the 
case of Maritime law could be extended to include these systems 
also. In this age is there a sound case for a distinction between 
the treatment of property on water and property on land" or 
in the air? It has been suggested the reason for the Maritime law 
exception is that the English law adopted the foreign law merchant 
with its doctrine of salvage, but never assimilated the correspond­
ing foreign law containing the doctrine of negotiorum gestio.'2
There are other exceptions to the general rule established 
by the Falcke decision. They are (1) the acceptance of a bill of 
exchange for honour,13 (2) the performance of another person’s 
duty,14 and (3) the supply of necessaries to disabled persons.15 
There is some question in English law whether an intervenor can 
recover where he attempted to help an injured person. It is well 
settled in Canada,16 however, that an intervenor who intends to 
charge for services, e.g. a professional man, may recover for
9 Sorell v. Paget, [1950] 1 K.B. 252. at p. 260 (C.A,).
Re Chetw ynds E state, (1938) Ch. 13 (C.A.).
Barish and Com pany  v. Rural M unicipality o f  the G ap No. 39  A N D  Biss (1925).
19 Sask. L.R. 560 (C.A.).
Fidelity Trust Co. v. Fenwick  (1922), 64 D.L.R. 647 (Ont. S.C.).
W heeler v. R osedale A pt. Ltd., [19591 O.R. 641.
D rager v. Allison e t al. (1958), 13 D.L.R. (2d.) 204.
10 Falcke  v. Scottish Im perial Insurance Co. ( 1887), 34 Ch.D. 234. at p. 249 (C .A.).
11 E.W. Hope, Officiousness (1929), 15 Corn. L.Q. 25. at p. 33.
12 Carleton Allen. Legal D uties  (1931), 40 Yale L.J. 331, at p. 374.
13 Vandew all v. Tyrrell ( m i ) ,  M. and M. 86, 173 E.R. 1090 (C.P.).
14 Shall v. Wright (1850), 12 Beav. 558, 50 E.R. 1174 (Rolls Court).
15 Williams v. W entworth  (1842), 5 Beav. 325, 49 E.R. 603 (Rolls Court).
Sam ilio et. al. v. Phillips et. al. (1968), 69 D.L.R. (2d.) 411 (B.C.S.C.) varied 
on other grounds, [1972] S.C.R. 201.
16 M atheson  v. Sm iley, [1932] 2 D.L.R. 787 (Man. C.A.).
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his services.17 Generally speaking, however, the law in Canada is 
very similar to that in England. The number of cases in point has 
not been great, but they tend to follow the decision in the Falcke 
case.18
There is one case decided by an Alberta court that deserves 
more careful consideration. In Riddell v. McRae19 the court 
seemed inclined to extend the doctrine of necessitous intervention 
to allow the intervenor to recover, but rationalized the decision 
in another manner to achieve the same result. In that case the 
defendent and the deceased owned adjoining lots outside the 
Calgary city limits. The defendant did not occupy his lot and the 
deceased took possession of it. After the deceased died his execu­
tors paid taxes on the defendant’s lot for nine years. When the 
executors discovered the true owner of the land, they sought to 
establish a lien on the defendant’s property for the amount of 
the taxes paid.
The deceased had communicated with the defendant some 
years before his death. In these communications he claimed to be 
in possession of, and to have some claim to or against the defend­
ant’s land. There was no evidence that the defendant ever an­
swered the deceased’s letters or that he consented to the claim in 
any way. Nevertheless, the court upheld the plaintiffs action for 
a lien on the property.
Beck J. wrote:
It seem s a fair inference that he . . . must have been under the impres­
sion that the lot in question had becom e subject to taxation and that 
either som eone, persumably the deceased or his representative, was pay­
ing the taxes upon i t ___ Under these circum stances I am of the opinion
that the plaintiff is entitled to a lien upon the defendant’s lo t.20
Beck J. further stated as support for his decision the judgment 
of Cotton L.J. in the Falcke case. Cotton L.J. said:
It is very true that if a man who has title to property sees another ex­
pending money upon it in the erroneous belief that he has title to  it 
when if fact he has no title, there is an important doctrine of equity  
which will prevent the real owner from insisting on his title so as to 
deprive the person who was acting on the supposition of his title o f the 
benefit of the expenditure.21
17 R. G off and G. Jones, The Law o f  R estitu tion  (1966), at p. 236.
18 A rding  v. Buckton  (1957). 6 D.L.R. (2d) 586 (B.C.C.A.).
D ra g ery . A llison e t al. (1958), 13 D.L.R. (2d) 204 (Sask. C.A.).
19 R iddell v. M cR ae  (1917), 11 Alta. L.R. 414 (App. D.).
20 Ibid ., at p. 415 (per Beck. J.).
21 Falcke  v. Scottish Im perial Insurance Co. (1887), 34 Ch. D. 234, at p. 242 
(per Cotton, L.J.).
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However, in the Riddell case, the deceased did not believe he 
had title to the defendant's lot. He felt he had a claim against the 
lot, but he realized his right was not established. In addition 
Bowen L.J. stated in the Falcke case that there could be recovery 
for a contract to be implied. It would seem that Riddell v. McRae 
is in direct contradiction to the Falcke case. In both cases the inter- 
venor was acting to protect what he at least thought was his prop­
erty interest yet the results are different.
The tone of Beck J.’s comments in the Riddell case indicates 
that he felt there should be a change in the law. He referred to the 
negotiorum gestio doctrine of Roman civil law, but he did not say 
how far the Alberta court could go in establishing that doctrine. 
He felt the case came . .  well within the most conservative state­
ment of the principle of law referred to.”22
However just the result of the Riddell case may be, it has not 
been followed on the question of a restitutionary claim in any sub­
sequent Canadian case. A very similar fact situation came before 
the Saskatchewan Court of Appeal in 1925 and the court did not 
allow recovery.23 More recent decisions of Canadian courts uni­
formly uphold Falcke v. Scottish Imperial Insurance Co.2* In 
conclusion, the decision in Riddell v. McRae may only show that 
some Canadian courts are inclined to soften the English law of 
necessitous intervention just as the Manitoba Court of Appeal did 
in Matheson v. Smiley.25
A similar problem to necessitous intervention exists in the 
case where an agency of necessity arises. The agent may be placed 
in an emergency situation and in order to protect his principal’s 
interest he exceeds his authority. Can he charge his principal for 
the expenses he incurs while acting beyond the scope of his author­
ity? The principle is well established that in the proper circum­
stances he can recover.26 The problem arises as to how far the 
court will extend the doctrine. There are strong opinions that the 
courts have already over-stepped the bounds of agency law and 
allowed recovery in cases which, in reality, are examples of neces­
22 R iddell v. M cR ae  (1917), 11 Alta. L.R. 414. at p. 416 (App. D.).
23 Barish and C om pany  v. Rural M unicipality o f  the G ap No. 39  an d  Biss (1925),
19 Sask. L.R. 560 (C.A.).
24 A rding  v. B uckton  (1957), 6 D.L.R. (2d) 586 (B.C.C.A.).
W heeler  v. R osedale A pt. L td., [1959] O.R. 641.
D rager  v. A llison e t al. (1958), 13 D.L.R. (2d) 204.
25 M atheson  v. Sm iley, [1932] 2 D.L.R. 787 (Man. C.A.).
26 P rager v. Blatspiel, Stam p and H eacock, Ltd., [1924] 1 K.B. 566, at pp. 571-73, 
(per McCardie J.).
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sitous intervention.27
Over the years the courts seem to have confused the law of 
agency of necessity with necessitous intervention. Where the facts 
of the situation indicate that a just result would be to allow the so- 
called agent to recover his expenses and where the court can es­
tablish a pre-existing relationship between the principal and the 
so-called agent, English courts have implied an agency of necessity 
to allow recovery. It can be argued, however, that they have 
overstepped the traditional law of agency in providing recovery 
for such intervenors.
Prager v. Blatspiel, Stamp and Heacock, Ltd.2* sets out four 
necessary conditions for an agency of necessity to arise.
(1) The agent must not have been able to obtain his princi­
pal’s instructions.
(2) There must have been a necessity to justify the agent’s 
actions.
(3) The agent must have acted in the best interests of the 
parties concerned.
(4) The action taken by the agent must have been reasonable.
It seems obvious from these conditions that “. . . it is a con­
dition precedent to the existence of implied authority of necessity 
that the person exercising it must be the servant or agent of an­
other.”29 It is extremely doubtful whether a principal can be bound 
by the act of a complete stranger.30 The law of agency is part of 
the law of contract. Thus, the relationship between an agent of 
necessity and principal must be a contractual one. This, at least, 
implies that the two parties have consented to contract. But surely 
the agent can do no act which lies outside the usual and ordinary 
bounds of his agreement. Yet in some agency of necessity instances 
this “. . . so-called agent is not in any sense an agent. He has done 
an act in the interest of another without the latter’s consent.”31
There are examples where land carriers,32 involuntary bailees,33
27 See below on agency of necessity and necessitous intervention.
28 Prager x. Blatspiel, S tam p and H eacock, L td., (19241 1 K.B. 566, at pp. 571-573, 
(per McCardie J.).
29 R. Powell, The Law o f  A gency  (1961 >, at p. 410.
30 G.C. Cheshire and C.H.S. Fifoot, The Law o f  C ontract (6th ed., 1964), at p. 407. 
Jebara v. O ttom an Bank, (1927) 2 K.B. 254, at p. 271 (C.A.).
31 R. Powell, The Law o f  A gency  (1961), at p. 410.
32 G reat Northern R ailw ay  v. Sw affield  (1874), L.R. 9 Ex. 132.
33 Sacks v. Miklos, (1948) 2 K.B. 23 (C.A.).
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consignees of goods,34 and finders of lost property,35 have been held 
to be agents of necessity. On the facts of many of these examples the 
supposed agent of necessity has acted entirely outside the usual 
scope of his employment. Since these “agents of necessity” have 
been able to recover their expenses, the principle of negotiorum 
gestio . .  seems to have been introduced through the back door.36 
But no consent is necessary for the gestor to intervene; whereas, 
in agency, there must be consent, expressed or implied. It is a com­
plete misapplication to use the law of agency of necessity in these 
situations. “There may be a necessity, but there is no agency.”37
(2) NONCONTRACTUAL SITUATIONS
So far we have considered cases primarily in a contractual 
or quasi-contractual context. There have been a number of cases 
dealing with volunteers, however, which have arisen in other areas 
of the law. Have the courts treated the volunteers in these cases 
with the same disdain they have shown in the contractual cases? 
It would appear there are inconsistencies in the law concerning 
volunteers.
The rescue cases in tort law are one example. There are a 
number of American cases38 allowing recovery in rescue situ­
ations and at least one English decision.30
Danger invites rescue. The cry of distress is the summons to relief.
The law does not ignore these reactions of the mind in tracing conduct 
to its consequences . . . .  The risk of rescue if only it be not wanton, 
is bom  of the occasion. The em ergency begets the man. The wrong­
doer may not have preseen the com ing of a deliverer. He is accountable  
as if he had.40
There are also American cases dealing with the rescue of 
property where recovery was allowed.41
Another possible exception exists where the intervenor is a 
finder of lost or straying property. One early English authority 
would indicate that such an intervenor cannot recover reimburse­
34 T etley  v. British Trade Corporation  ( 1922), unreported, but cited in 10 LI .L.R. 
678.
35 Binstead  v. Buck  (1776), 2Wm. bl. 1117, %  E.R. 660 (K.B.).
36 R. Powell, The Law o f  A gency  ( 1961 ), at p. 424.
37 Ibid., at p. 424.
38 Dixon  v. N ew  York, N ew  Haven and H artford R ailw ay Co. (1910), 92 N.E. 
1030 (Mass. Sup. Jud. Ct.).
39 Brandon  v. Osborn, G arrett and C om pany, [1924] 1 K.B. 548 (K.B.).
40 W agner v. International Railway  (1921), 133 N.E. 437 (N.Y. Ct. App).
41 Liming v. Illinois Central Railroad  (1890), 47 N.W. 66 (Iowa Sup. Ct.).
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ment.42 The main authority, however, is Nicholson v. Chapman,*3 
where P noticed some logs carried a considerable distance by the 
tide and he voluntarily moved them to a place of safety. He would 
not give up the logs unless reimbursed his expenses, and he sought 
to establish a lien on the property.
In denying his claim Eyre C.J. said:
This is a good office, and meritorous, at least in the moral sense of the 
word, and certainly entitles the party to som e reasonable recom pense, 
from the bounty, if not from the justice o f the owner . . . perhaps it is 
better for the public that these voluntary acts of benevolence from one 
man to another, which are charities and moral duties, should depend  
altogether for their reward upon the moral duty o f gratitude.44
This statement would seem to indicate that in some circum­
stances recovery should be available to a mere finder. It should be 
pointed out, however, that Eyre C.J.’s judgment was given during 
that period of English law when moral obligations were sufficient 
to raise legal liabilities, a concept which was overruled in Wennall 
v. Adney.Ai Nevertheless, some writers still hold that Nicholson v. 
Chapman only denies the action to establish a lien and is not 
necessarily dicta against recovery by a finder.46
Another interesting situation involving a volunteer arose in 
Schneider v. Eisovitch,47 In that case a woman was injured in 
France in a car accident caused by the negligence of the defend­
ant. In an action for damages she included the travelling expenses 
incurred by her brother-in-law who rendered necessary services 
to her while she was in the hospital. The plaintiff had not requested 
the services of the brother-in-law. They were strictly voluntary. 
Nevertheless, the court included them as part of the damages. 
“Strict legal liability is not the be-all and end-all of the tort-feasor’s 
liability.”48 However, a later court held differently on a similar 
point49 and it is unlikely that Schneider v. Eisovitch would be 
followed today in England or Canada.
Another inconsistency appears to arise in trust law.
42 Binstead  v. Buck  (1776), 2 Wm. Bl. 1117, 96 E.R. 660 (K.B.).
43 Nicholson  v. Chapman  (1793), 2 H. Bl, 254, 126 E.R. 536 (C.P.).
44 Ibid., at pp. 257-259.
45 Wennall v. A dn ey  (1802), 3 Bos. and Pul. 247, 127 E.R. 137 (C.P.).
46 Walter B. W illiston, A gency o f  N ecessity  (1944). 22 Can. Bar Rev. at pp. 492, 
503, 508.
47 Schneider  v. E isovitch , [19601 2 Q.B. 430 at p. 490 (per Pauli J.).
48 Ibid.. at p. 44.
49 Gage  v. King, [ 19611 1 Q-B. 188 (per Diplock J.).
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The law of trusts recognizes a limited kind of negotiourm  gestio  in the 
familiar principle that a trustee who has properly and reasonably paid 
money out of pocket for the preservation of the trust property is en­
titled to be reimbursed out o f the estate . . .*°
A similar principle applies to executors.51 it must be recog­
nized, however, that in both of these situations there is some form 
of pre-existing relationship between the parties.
The above examples are all cases where persons volunteered 
their services and were recompensed in tort law or trust law for 
those services, ir. each of the cases the volunteer acted with a 
good moral intention in what seemed a necessary and reasonable 
manner. Yet in none of the cases is there a contract or request for 
the specific services provided.
The case of the unintentional trespasser presents another in­
consistency. If an unintentional trespasser removes something 
from another’s property and adds to the value of the property 
removed by manufacture, he often will be allowed to keep the 
value he added.52 Being a trespasser, he is inherently a wrongdoer 
and a tortfeasor. He has no intention of benefitting the plaintiff. 
In addition the unintentional trespasser is, in many cases, negli­
gent. Nevertheless, the law considers the substantial and important 
thing to be the increase in value.53 But if a necessitous intervenor 
enters another’s property to save it from destruction, the law will 
not treat him as well as the trespasser, even though he intentionally 
trespasses. This is well established in English and Canadian law.54 
The result is that the unintentional trespasser, who, in fact, does 
not know what he is doing, will be allowed to benefit from his 
actions. But the necessitous intervenor, who does know what he is 
doing, will not.
These examples would indicate that the courts are not particularly 
consistent in their development of the law relating to volunteers. 
In the extreme case they have placed a tortfeasor in a better po­
sition than the necessitous intervenor.
Negotiorum Gestio
It has been suggested that the English courts have been in­
consistent in accepting the doctrine of maritime salvage from the
50 R e Leslie (1883). 23 Ch. D. 552.
51 D avey  v. Cornwallis, [1931] 2 D.L.R. 80 at p. 83 (Man. C.A.).
52 D etroit S tee l Cooperage C om pany  v. Sisterville Brewing Com pany  (1914),
34 Sup. Ct. 753.
53 E.W. Hope, Officiousness (1929), 15 Corn.L.Q. 25, at p. 33.
54 C ope  v. Sharpe (No. 2). [1912] 1 K.B. 4%  (C.A.).
Australasian Steam  Navigation Com pany  v. M orse  (1892), L.R. 4 P.C. 272.
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foreign law merchant while not accepting the equivalent “land” 
doctrine of negotiorum gestio. The doctrine has not been com­
pletely overlooked for it has been mentioned by the courts in a 
few of the cases dealing with volunteers. Perhaps it would be 
worthwhile to examine this doctrine, determine whether in effect, 
it differs substantially from the present English-Canadian law, 
and consider if such a principle should be accepted by our courts.
Unlike his American counterpart, who is often contemptuously char­
acterized as an officious intermeddler, the European volunteer who 
without request intervenes in another's affairs has been under this doc­
trine o f negotiorum  gestio , rewarded for his efforts and encouraged  
in his behaviour.55
This statement is also applicable to Anglo-Canadian law. One 
writer has outlined six conditions of negotiorum gestio in Roman 
civil law.56
(1) The agent must have carried on another’s (the principal’s) 
business in the interest of the principal.
(2) The business must have been done “voluntarily” by the 
agent.
(3) The act must have been done by the agent with the ex­
pectation of reimbursement for his expenses.
(4) The agent could not recover his expenses if his inter­
vention was contrary to the express wish of the principal.
(5) The act done must have been advantageous to the princi­
pal, or would have been to the principal’s advantage if 
successful.
(6) The circumstances under which the intervention took 
place must have been such that the intervention was 
reasonable.
It has been said that the doctrine as it originally developed 
was a combination of trust law and agency law.57 Gradually, as 
the classification of bailment known as “mandate” developed, 
the doctrine of negotiorum gestio narrowed. Eventually it came 
to be principally concerned with the altruistic deeds of inter- 
venors. Even though the doctrine has little to do with agency law 
as such, many express agency concepts still persist in the appli-
55 J.T. Dawson, Negotiorum  G estio: The A ltru istic In term eddler (1961), 74 Harv. 
L.R. 817, 1073.
56 Ernest G. Lorenzen. The N egotiorum  G estio  in Roman and M odern  C ivil 
Law  (1928), 13 Corn.L.Q. 190.
57 SJ . Stoljar, The Law o f  Quasi-Contracts (1964), at p. 189.
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cation of the doctrine.58
It has been suggested that, in reality, there is very little dif­
ference between the Roman law and our present law.59 Indeed, it 
has been said that the only substantial difference has to do with the 
volunteer who preserves another’s property.60 And even there the 
consequences of the difference may be insignificant. In practice, 
cases allowing recovery in these situations are very rare, even in 
countries where the Roman civil law is followed.61 The English 
rule denying recovery and imposing liability on the intervenor has 
proved to be equally unimportant.62 As a consequence the in­
clusion or exclusion of the doctrine may have little practical im­
pact on the law.
Nevertheless, there seem to be two principal and potentially 
practical differences between the two rules of law.
(1) Negotiorum gestio is a much more flexible rule to apply. 
It can adjust more readily to changing situations and 
allows more equitable decisions in favour of necessitous 
intervenors.
(2) The underlying principle of negotiorum gestio is a moral 
obligation that is translated into a legal duty. Perhaps 
the English-Canadian law does not sufficiently recognize 
the idea of mutual aid.
A Good Samaritan Duty?
Not since Lord Denman in Eastwood v. Kenyon63 overruled 
Lord Mansfield’s doctrine that a moral obligation was consider­
ation to support a contract has English law recognized a Good 
Samaritan duty on the part of its citizens. “. . . As a general prin­
ciple our law has shown itself extremely chary of imposing al­
truistic duties.”64 Should the law command as a positive duty the 
obligation to act in a highly moral fashion?
Bentham has written:
A woman's head-dress catches fire, water is at hand. A man instead of
assisting to quench the fire looks on. and laughs at it. A drunken man.
58 J.P. Dawson, Negotiorum  G estio: The A ltru istic In term eddler  (1961), 74 Harv. 
L.R. 817, 1073 at p. 1127.
59 S.J. Stoljar, The Law o f  Quasi-Contracts (1964), at p. 194.
60 Ibid.. at P. 193.
61 J.P. Dawson, N egotiorum  G estio: The A ltru istic In term eddler  (1961), 74 Harv. 
L.R. 817, 1073, at p. 1081.
62 Ibid., at p. 1127.
63 E astw ood  v. K enyon  (1840), 11 A. and E. 438, 113 E.R. 482 (Q.B.).
64 Carlton Allen, Legal D uties (1931), 40 Yale L.J. 331, at p. 367.
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falling with his face downwards into a puddle, is in danger of suffocation. 
Lifting his head a little to one side would save him. Another man sees 
this and lets him lie. A quantity o f gunpowder lies scattered about a 
room; a man is going into it with a lighted candle; another man knowing 
lets him go without warning. W ho is there that in any of these cases 
would think punishment misapplied?
. . .  In cases where the person is in danger why should it not be made 
the duty of every man to keep another from mischief, when it can be 
done without prejudicing himself, as well as to abstain from bringing 
it on him ?65
The problems raised in the case of necessitous intervention 
are basically moral ones. Is it time we reconsidered Lord Mans­
field’s doctrine or accepted Bentham’s proposition? European 
civil law jurisdictions support the doctrine of negotiorum gestio. 
They also recognize contracts without exchange as legally binding. 
Are these systems of law any less just or uncertain than the English 
common law? Do we sufficiently recognize the concept of good 
samaritanism? Progressive technological developments make us 
increasingly interdependent on our fellow man. The law should 
not stifle human nature.66
Pauli J. said in Schneider v. Eisovitch67 that the defendent’s . . 
responsibilities could not be limited to reimbursing only strictly 
legal liabilities of the plaintiff.”68 In a recent Privy Council case69 
the court imposed on a landowner the obligation and responsibility 
of protecting his neighbour’s land from hazards not caused by the 
landowner, but flowing from his land. These cases would suggest 
that the courts, at least in certain situations, are willing to, and 
are going to, require humanitarian conduct from the parties.
How far this trend will develop is unascertainable. Our con­
cern is whether the law should adopt a more humanitarian and 
liberal approach to the interests of the necessitous intervenor. If 
a different approach is felt desirable, the law should be changed.
CONCLUSION
Before it can be said that a particular legal doctrine is wrong, 
or unjust, or anachronistic, and should be changed, it is necessary
65. Jeremy Bentham, A n Introduction to the Principles o f  M orals and Legislation  
(1823). at p. 148.
66 J.P. Dawson, Negotiorum  G estio: The A ltru istic In term eddler  (1961), 74 
Harv.L.R. 817, 1073.
67 Schneider x. Eisovitch, (I960) 2 Q.B. 430 (per Pauli J.).
68 Ibid.
69 Goldm an  v. Hargrave, [ 1966] 2 All.E.R. 989 (P.C.); see Laurence W. Anderson, 
Goldm an  v. Hargrave: Liability o f  a Bad Samaritan fo r  the Natural Condition  
o f  his Land  (1967), 3 U.B.C.L.R. 211.
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to consider the possible reasons or justifications for the rule, 
whether they are enunciated or not. The following are possible 
justifications for the present common law of necessitous inter­
vention.
(1) Self determination is a mark of the English race. The 
Englishman distinctly wishes to “muddle through” in his 
own way.70 Needless to say, this reason does not seem 
particularly relevant. One writer has called it “nonsense”.71
(2) To allow the necessitous intervenor to recover would make 
a sham of the early and long enduring supremacy of the con­
tract concept in the English law.72 It has been pointed out, 
however, that European civil law systems have succeeded 
just as well as the common law without this sanctity of the 
contractual relationship.
(3) “The idealist may see in it an assertion of the lofty principle 
that the virtuous act should be its own reward ..  .”73
(4) The cynic, however, may say that the man who chooses to 
give, rather than to sell his services, is but the more fool for 
it.74 The mistrust shown by the Courts of Equity toward the 
“mere volunteer” supports this view.
(5) Granting recovery in such cases would encourage inter­
meddling. As already has been pointed out, this problem 
has not developed in those civil law systems where ne- 
gotiorum gestio is a part of the law.
(6) There is an irrebuttable presumption of a gift when serv­
ices are offered voluntarily. One commentator feels there 
should never be an irrebuttable presumption of gift except 
in case of services rendered by members of a family to one 
another.75
(7) The application by the courts of a broad test such as “unjust 
enrichment” would result in the decision in each case being 
reached through the subjective moral determination of 
the judge and not in accordance with predictable or ob­
jective rules of law.76
70 E.W. H ope, Officiousness (1929), 15 Corn.L.Q. 25.
71 SJ . Stoljar, The Law o f  Quasi-Contracts (1964), at p. 161, footnote 4.
72 E.W. Hope, Officiousness (1929), 15 Corn.L.Q- 25.
73 J.B. Milner, Cases and M aterials on Contracts  (1967), at p. 198.
74 Ibid.. at p. 375.
75 E.W. H ope, Officiousness (1929), 15Com .L.Q . 25. at p. 36.
76 W.S. Holdsworth, Unjustifiable E nrichm ent (1939), 55 Law 0 -R ev . 37, at p. 51.
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It should be pointed out, however, that . .  law is also a con­
scious or proposed growth. . .  and the judge is directed to the attain­
ment of the moral end and its embodiment in legal forms.”77
Finally, it has been said that the present state of the law of 
necessitous intervention is not the consequence of an unsympa­
thetic judiciary, but rather . . because the courts have vainly 
tried to squeeze the facts of the cases before them into a frame 
which is wholly unsuited to their requirements.”78 The commen­
tator, here, was speaking specifically of the court’s flirtation 
with the doctrine of agency of necessity. This comment probably 
expresses most accurately the reason why the law is as it is today. 
The often sympathetic courts did not feel there were any existing 
legal forms which could have been adapted to accommodate the 
particular moral principles and decisions it wished to effect. Yet 
because the common law courts are adverse to openly recognizing 
their own short-comings, other reasons, some rational, some non­
sensical, have been strewn in the flowery wake of judicial de­
cisions and comment to obscure the true feelings of the court.
Is there a way out? Technically, a change could be made by 
the legislature or by the courts. We shall only consider the pos­
sibility of the courts accommodating the change within the com­
mon law. There are at least four judicial methods by which the 
doctrine of necessitous intervention could be introduced into 
Anglo-Canadian law.
(1) Agency o f Necessity
The courts might imply an agent-principal relationship in 
two areas of the law which it now does not. First, where a stranger 
preserves another’s property unofficiously and secondly, in the 
case of a finder. There is convincing evidence, however, that the 
legitimate bounds of agency have already been crossed.79 Also, 
it is doubtful whether an agency relationship can or should arise 
where there is no pre-existing contractual agreement.80 Even if 
the courts were to allow recovery in these extended areas, they 
would still be bound within the aegis of the law of agency which 
could restrict the development of flexible rules.
77 B. Cardozo, The Nature o f  the Judicial Process (1921). at p. 105.
78 R. Powell, The Law o f  A gency  (1961), at p. 424.
79 Ibid., at p. 424.
80 Jebara  v. O ttom an Bank, (1927 ) 2 K.B. 252. at p. 271 (C.A.).
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(2) Tort Law
Tort law could be extended along the lines of Schneider v. 
Eisovitch81 and the rescue cases. Higher standards of conduct 
could be imposed as legal duties through the law of negligence. 
However, in any tort case, the intervenor could recover only if 
the defendant were negligent or a tortfeasor, giving rise to dam­
ages.
(3) Acceptance o f Negotiorum Gestio
Many of the principles of negotiorum gestio are good and 
should be introduced into our law. There are two ways of doing 
this:
(1) by the courts developing a particular branch or branches 
of the law; or
(2) legislation.
Either of these methods would, of course, be acceptable, 
but the first is more likely. Some European countries have adopted 
appropriate legislation.
(4) Restitution
Many writers feel this is the best vehicle for introducing more 
just principles into the law of necessitous intervention.82 “Roman 
law placed the problem correctly in quasi-contract . . .”83 it is said. 
Through the principles of unjust enrichment the courts could es­
tablish fair and just guidelines for recovery by the necessitous 
intervenor.84
Where the intervenor has acted unofficiously and in good 
faith and in circumstances making the act necessary and reason­
able, he should not be denied recovery if a benefit was conferred 
on the defendant and the act was not intended to be gratuitous.
81 Schneider  v. E isovitch , [I960] 2 Q.B. 430 (per Pauli J.).
82 R. Powell, The Law o f  A gency  (1961).
J.P. Dawson, N egotiorum  G estio : The A ltru istic In term eddler  (1961), 74 
Harv.L.R. 817, 1073.
E.W. Hope, Officiousness (1929), 15 Corn.L.Q. 25.
R. G off and G. Jones, The Law o f  R estitu tion  (1966).
83 E.W. Hope, O fficiousness (1929), 15 Corn.L.Q- 25, at p. 30.
84 There are two recent cases in the area of restitution which seem to indicate 
a more liberal approach by the Courts. In Samilo e t al. v. Phillips e t al. (1968),
69 D.L.R. (2d) 29, the Court allowed the son of a mental incom petent to re­
cover incom e tax fines and penalties he had paid in respect of his father’s 
business even though the father was not aware that the payments had been 
made. The son was able to recover on the basis o f the incom petency of his 
father as well as the provision of necessaries. However, the Court held in
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addition that the law of necessitous intervention would support the son’s claim . 
The case, however, may not be particularly helpful in the classic volunteer  
case since there obviously was a relationship, business or otherwise, between  
the son and the father prior to the volunteer act.
The second case. R e Jacques (1968), 66 D.L.R. (2d) 30, allowed neighbours 
to recover for benefits conferred on an old woman in ill health living alone 
on a farm. The Court held that the law of restitution could create an obligation  
on her estate to pay for the benefits received even though there was no inten­
tion on her part to pay. The editorial note in the case notes that “the real 
basis for these claims is simply the unofficious performance of beneficial 
services by one without gratuitous intent . . . .” Although the case seem s to  
clarify the meaning of Deglm an  v. Guaranty Trust Co. o f  Canada and Con- 
stantineau, (1954] 3 D.L.R. 785, at p. 794; (1954] S.C.R. 725, a basis for the 
decision seem s to be that the parsimonious old woman induced her neigh­
bours to perform beneficial services for her. If the elem ent o f inducement 
is an aspect of the case, then it may not be of considerable help in a strictly 
voluntary situation where there is no pre-existing relationship between the 
parties.
